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ABSTRACT 
Humanitarian assistance is of growing importance to the United States and the 
Department of Defense’s strategic objectives.  Thus, United States combatant commands 
increasingly rely on humanitarian assistance cargo transportation programs to deliver 
material to people in need in their areas of responsibility.  This report analyzes the 
options available to these commands in seeking humanitarian assistance cargo 
transportation.  The report offers a description of current operations, with a specific focus 
on the European area of responsibility, where humanitarian assistance cargo 
transportation programs have had limited activity. 
The analysis reaches the following conclusions: (1) currently no transportation 
program exists that focuses on providing a quality of service to combatant commands’ 
humanitarian assistance transportation needs; (2) legal, fiscal, and operational 
mechanisms exist and are outlined to create such a program: and (3) exclusively  
space-available transportation is generally insufficient for providing the quality of service 
that may be required for relationship-building through humanitarian assistance cargo 
transportation, and contract shipping may be necessary.  These conclusions are placed in 
the context of current humanitarian assistance operations, and relevant operational 
considerations are highlighted throughout the document.  The analysis is based on both a 
quantitative model of transportation, as well as detailed conversations with Department of 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Presidential, national military, individual service, and combatant commander 
strategic documents all list humanitarian assistance as one of the core goals and 
responsibilities of the United States armed forces.  One part of humanitarian assistance 
programs is the transportation of nongovernmental organization cargo from the  
United States to destinations in need.  This report analyzes three programs for the 
transportation of such cargo:  the Denton Program, the Funded Transportation Program, 
and Project Handclasp.  The Denton Program and the Funded Transportation Program are 
employed by the Department of Defense, while Project Handclasp is a Department of the 
Navy program.  All three programs have historically had limited activity to European 
destinations when compared to other geographic areas of responsibility. 
The three programs operate under different legal authorities, funding sources, and 
operational structures.  The Denton Program’s legal authority comes from the U.S. Code 
for the Armed Forces, Title 10, Section 402.  It is funded by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency and United States Transportation Command.  The Funded 
Transportation Program’s legal authority comes from U.S. Code for the Armed Forces, 
Title 10, Section 2561, and it is funded by the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster 
Assistance and Civic Aid appropriation.  Project Handclasp operates under a Chief of 
Naval Operations instruction and is funded by the Navy. 
The analysis shows that currently no transportation program exists that focuses on 
providing a quality of service to combatant commands’ humanitarian assistance 
transportation needs.  Both the Denton Program and the Funded Transportation Program 
are a public service by the Department of Defense to nongovernmental organizations, and 
are driven by applications to the programs from nonmilitary sources.  Project Handclasp 
is a Navy program, funded by the Navy, with its current focus primarily on  
Navy missions. 
 The analysis outlines the legal, fiscal, and operational mechanisms that may be 
used to create a program that focuses on providing a quality of service to combatant 
command’s humanitarian assistance transportation needs.  While several options for lead 
x 
executor of such a program exist, the recommended option is utilizing existing facilities 
by creating a joint role for Project Handclasp.  In this way, Project Handclasp can execute 
a similar mission for combatant commands as it currently does for the Navy, using 
several new methods of transport.  Project Handclasp has been used by combatant 
commands in the past; however, operational and organizational hurdles must be 
overcome before it can serve a clearly defined joint role. 
 Finally, the analysis employs an analytical model of space-available 
transportation to estimate the shipping capacity to European destinations.  The analytical 
model shows that exclusively space-available transportation is generally insufficient for 
providing the quality of service that may be required for relationship-building through 
humanitarian assistance cargo transportation, and that contracted shipping may be 
necessary.  The analytical model further shows only limited improvement of combined 





Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from the United States have conducted 
humanitarian relief operations across the world for years.  In the last several years, the 
military has become increasingly more involved in providing this type of assistance as 
well.  This is evident in the most recent release of the National Military Strategy, which 
emphasizes the importance of building and strengthening international strategic 
partnerships (Department of Defense, 2011).  In order to support these strategic goals, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) employs two programs, and the Department of the Navy 
(DoN) operates and maintains an additional program, to ship NGO-owned humanitarian 
assistance (HA) cargo to overseas countries in need.  The DoD programs are the Denton 
Program and the Funded Transportation Program, and the DoN program is Project 
Handclasp.  All three programs operate independently of each other through different 
operational guidelines, funding sources, and legal authorities.  However, they all work in 
conjunction with U.S. government country teams and coordinate through representatives 
of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
In recent years, United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has been very 
successful in utilizing these programs for cargo delivery to their area of responsibility 
(AOR).  United States European Command (EUCOM), however, has not enjoyed the 
same amount of success.  For example, in 2009, Project Handclasp delivered 750 pallets 
of HA cargo, weighing nearly 500,000 pounds, to SOUTHCOM AOR, but only one 
pallet was transported to Europe (United States Navy Project Handclasp, 2009).  In the 
same year, the Funded Transportation Program shipped just two containers of 
humanitarian aid materials to EUCOM, while SOUTHCOM received 49 (Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency, 2010).  Similarly, in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, the 
Denton Program transported 1,208,962 pounds of cargo to 13 countries in SOUTHCOM.  
In the same period, only 7,000 pounds were delivered to one country in EUCOM (Joint 
Relief International, 2011). 
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B. SCOPE OF STUDY 
The main objective of this study is to understand why EUCOM is underserved by 
the DoD HA transportation programs.  A secondary goal of this research is to outline 
possible policy changes toward a standardized system that can be used by all combatant 
commanders in order to deliver humanitarian cargo to intended recipients within their 
respective AORs.  In order to provide context to the study, in Section II of this report we 
outline the current operational procedures of the three programs and their governing legal 
authorities.  In Section III, we outline possible policy and operational changes to increase 
shipping capacity of HA material to EUCOM and other combatant commands 
(COCOMs).  Finally, in Section IV, we quantify the benefits of these policy changes and 
operational changes through an analytical model of HA cargo transportation. 
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II. OPERATIONAL CONTEXT AND CURRENT 
PROGRAM OPERATIONS 
A. IMPORTANCE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CARGO 
TRANSPORTATION MISSIONS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was one of the most devastating natural disasters 
in history, leaving over 200,000 dead and millions homeless in 14 countries.  In response, 
over $14 billion dollars was donated from nations across the world in what some deem 
the largest relief effort to date.  This natural disaster and subsequent relief efforts changed 
the scale of HA, and also changed the approaches and views of the United States 
government and the DoD toward HA programs.  Admiral Stavridis, current EUCOM 
Commander, stressed the following in his recent book, Partnership for the Americas:  
Western Hemisphere Strategy and the U.S. Southern Command: 
As shown by DoD’s experience in Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami, aid can 
produce a significant amount of sustained goodwill toward the United States, and 
particularly toward its military.  Putting a face to the U.S. military, especially 
when the face is that of a doctor performing surgeries, or that of a SeaBees team 
building a medical center, can only be a force for improving international 
relations and creating a positive perception of the United States.  (2010, p. 142) 
Prior to Stavridis’ job as Commander of EUCOM, he held the position of 
SOUTHCOM Commander.  As SOUTHCOM Commander, in 2006, he initiated several 
HA missions in South America and the Caribbean.  One of the most successful of these 
operations was Continuing Promise 2007.  For this mission, the USNS COMFORT, a 
hospital ship, conducted medical missions in 12 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  The exercise was so successful that it was reinitiated the following year with 
two amphibious ships—one that was deployed to the Pacific and one to the Atlantic.  
Altogether, the two amphibious ships treated more than 200,000 patients, in several 
countries, around the world that year. 
The United States Pacific Fleet developed a similar annual operation in 2006, 
called Pacific Partnership.  It was designed to provide HA to countries in the  
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United States Pacific Command (PACOM) region.  In 2010, the Pacific Partnership 
interagency operation included 10 partner nations, 19 NGOs, USAID, and the U.S. Public 
Health Service.  As part of that mission, Project Handclasp distributed over 58 pallets of 
donated material, worth over $162,000, to six host nations (L. Franchetti, personal 
communication, June 30, 2010). 
As evidence of the DoD’s increasing awareness of the benefits of HA, through 
missions such as those in South America and the Pacific, the latest National Military 
Strategy emphasizes the importance of strengthening and building international relations 
through HA operations: 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities employ the Joint Force to 
address partner needs and sometimes provide opportunities to build confidence 
and trust between erstwhile adversaries.  They also help us gain and maintain 
access and relationships that support our broader national interests.  (Department 
of Defense, 2011, p. 17) 
In order to achieve these strategic goals, all the COCOMs define the necessary 
steps to build relations in their respective AORs through their Theater Security 
Cooperation plans.  Specifically for EUCOM, Stavridis’ priorities focus on building and 
strengthening partnerships with European counterparts: 
   While ensuring [EUCOM] readiness to execute military operations in 
support of contingency plans, EUCOM will 
    1. Build partnerships to enhance security, regional stability, 
and support of global initiatives like ISAF [International 
Security Assistance Force] 
    2. Strengthen NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
collective defense and assist its transformation 
    3. Support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 
    4. Counter transnational threats 
    5. Engage Israel, Russia, and Turkey in areas of mutual 
interest.  (United States European Command, n. d., p. 7) 
To accomplish these objectives, EUCOM must be able to partner with NGOs to 
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effectively use the HA programs to transport NGO-owned cargo to intended recipients. 
B. CURRENT DENTON OPERATIONS 
The Denton Program (Denton) provides transportation of NGO cargo at no cost to 
the NGO and is jointly administered by USAID, the Department of State (DoS), and the 
DoD.  The program was originally created by Jeremiah Denton, a Senator from Alabama, 
as an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  Senator Denton created the 
program to use space-available to deliver NGO cargo to third-world countries.  It was not 
until 1985, however, that the Denton Program was implemented (Norman, 2011). 
Since the Denton Program is a DoD program, it is governed by the U.S. Code 
(USC) for the Armed Forces, Title 10.  Specifically, the legal authority for Denton’s 
operations comes from USC 10, Section 402.  The law states that, notwithstanding other 
provisions of law, “the Secretary of Defense may transport to any country without 
charge, supplies which have been furnished by a nongovernmental source and which are 
intended for humanitarian assistance.  Such supplies may be transported only on a space 
available basis” (Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries, 
2011). Section 402 continues to describe specific requirements that must be met before 
material can be accepted for shipment.  For example, the material must be in suitable 
condition, adequate arrangements must be made for its distribution in the destination 
county, and there must be a legitimate humanitarian need for it.  Section 402 concludes 
with a yearly reporting requirement to Congress for any cargo shipped using the legal 
authority provided. 
Since Denton uses strictly space-available on military assets, the costs to the DoD 
are minimal; however, some funding is necessary to administer and facilitate cargo 
movement.  Much of this work is done by the United States Transportation Command 
(TRANSCOM) contractor Joint Relief International (JRI).  The funding for JRI is 
covered by TRANSCOM and the Defense Security Cooperation Association (DSCA)  
(P. Marshall, personal communication, July 7, 2011). 
In order to meet each of the requirements in USC 10, Section 402, Denton has a 
specific operational procedure for NGOs to follow, which is outlined in Chapter 12 of 
DoD Instruction 5105.38-M.  First, the NGO donor contacts USAID and fills out an 
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online application.  USAID then coordinates approval of the application with DoS and 
DSCA.  However, before any material is accepted, the donor must complete the 
necessary customs paperwork, obtain a duty-free letter, and identify a legitimate 
consignee of the material in the destination country, as per Section 402, before their 
application can be approved by the Denton Program.  Additionally, the material must be 
properly packaged and a suitable space-available route from the cargo’s origin to its final 
destination must be identified by the JRI contractor.  If no such route exists, the cargo is 
not accepted because it cannot be transported.  The NGO must assume all costs 
associated with customs, packaging, and cargo delivery to the time and place  
of embarkation. 
Once an application is accepted and a space-available route is identified, the 
process of moving the cargo can begin.  JRI uses the TRANSCOM Single Mobility 
System (SMS), an online tracking system containing primarily military aircraft data, to 
find available transportation channels.  While SMS has some functionality targeted 
specifically at Denton, no automated system exists for finding space-available routes.  To 
facilitate a shipment, JRI contractors must manually search possible routes to determine 
likely space-available channels to the destination.  Accepted NGO cargo is classified as 
Transportation Priority 4 (TP-4) cargo, which is the lowest cargo classification level in 
terms of priority in the DoD logistics system.  JRI is able to track the cargo electronically, 
using a Transportation Cargo Number (TCN) on the Global Air Transportation Execution 
System (GATES) and on a system called IDE/GTN Convergence (IGC), which is the 
convergence of Global Transportation Network (GTN) and Integrated Data Environment 
(IDE); as well as through personal communications between JRI and personnel at 
transshipment locations.  JRI tracks the cargo until its final destination, where USAID 
representatives, as well as U.S. military personnel involved with the cargo transportation, 
coordinate with a prearranged consignee to properly distribute the donations to the 
intended recipients (K. Hundemer, personal communication, June 28, 2011). 
Denton cargo can be shipped quickly on a well-utilized, space-available route 
once the cargo is accepted.  For example, the process typically takes less than a week, 
and usually no more than two weeks, for cargo travelling through Ramstein Air Force 
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Base in Germany to its ultimate destination (D. Noe, personal communication,  
June 2, 2011).  However, the application process for cargo acceptance can take time, and 
material is not always guaranteed to be accepted due to various aforementioned reasons. 
At its core, the Denton Program is designed to be a public service offered by the 
DoD to NGO donors, who drive the Denton Program process through their initial 
applications.  Although the donors must cover some incurring costs and complete the 
required paperwork prior to material acceptance, the program offers the NGO donors a 
benefit by providing transportation at no cost.  The Denton Program realizes this, so, in 
order to avoid being inundated with requests from a single NGO, they have implemented 
policies to be fair to all NGOs.  For example, the program will typically accept only one 
shipment per NGO at a time. 
Legally, the Denton Program can use space-available pallet positions on any 
military asset for transportation.  However, the Navy and other services do not use SMS 
for tracking, so Denton has limited visibility of Navy shipping and of space-available on 
aircraft other than that of the Air Force.  As a result, Denton only uses Air Force channel, 
contingency, and Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) flights for space-available 
cargo transportation. 
There are several reasons for the limited use of the Denton Program in the 
EUCOM AOR, compared to other AORs.  One reason is that shipment applications are 
initiated by NGOs.  Without NGO applications with a European destination, no material 
can be delivered to Europe.  The lack of applications for European destinations is due to 
several factors.  First, NGOs often donate material in response to perceived high poverty 
levels or a natural disaster, such as the earthquake that devastated Haiti in 2010.  Thus, a 
large number of NGOs apply for transportation to the SOUTHCOM or PACOM AORs 
because of their countries’ high susceptibility to these types of disasters and their 
perceived poverty levels.  Second, SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM have a much higher 
frequency of inbound DoD transportation assets than EUCOM, due to the proximity of 
SOUTHCOM to the U.S. and the high number of contingency missions flying to 
CENTCOM to support the war efforts.  As a result, NGOs take advantage of these 
opportunities and apply for delivery to countries within the aforementioned AORs instead 
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of to EUCOM, where the main countries of interest have a much lower frequency of 
available DoD transportation channels. A Denton application for transportation to these 
remote European locations may be rejected because potential suitable delivery routes 
cannot be found.  The drawdown of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will further 
reduce the number of space-available pallet positions to European destinations because, 
typically, Denton cargo transported to Europe utilizes contingency missions that are 
maintained in order to support the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
A final limiting factor to Denton operations is staffing.  Although JRI utilizes 
computer systems, such as SMS, to identify available routes, cargo delivery and mission 
success are ultimately reliant on person-to-person coordination and networking in order 
to find space available in a timely fashion.  The process is by no means automated.  
Additionally, verifying NGO requests, finding space-available routes, and tracking 
shipments can be a labor-intensive process that is often limited not necessarily by lack of 
space-available transportation, but rather by a limited amount of manpower.  As a result, 
if difficult-to-identify-and-administer, space-available routes do exist, they may  
go unutilized. 
C. CURRENT FUNDED TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS 
The Funded Transportation Program (FTP) also provides transportation for  
NGO-owned cargo at no cost to the NGO.  FTP is administered by DSCA, and the 
program derives its legal authority through USC 10, Section 2561.  The section states 
“funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for . . . humanitarian 
assistance shall be used for the purpose of providing transportation of humanitarian relief 
and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide” (Humanitarian Assistance, 2011). It 
concludes with an explanation of the annual reporting requirement to Congress for any 
funds that are used for humanitarian relief and humanitarian cargo transportation 
missions funded by the DoD. 
Funds for FTP and several other programs are provided yearly by the Overseas 
Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation.  FTP 
receives a variable amount each year that usually totals approximately $1.5 million 
dollars to be used for all FTP transportation worldwide. 
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Operationally, FTP is similar to the Denton Program.  In both cases, the process is 
initiated by an NGO submitting an application.  In the case of FTP, the application is 
handled by DSCA.  The NGO application and cargo for FTP have the same requirements 
as Denton:  the cargo must have a legitimate humanitarian purpose, it must be packaged 
properly, customs paperwork with a duty-free letter must be completed, and a consignee 
of the material in the destination country must be identified and verified before the 
application is approved (Funded Transportation Program, 2011).  Because FTP purchases 
transportation for the cargo from outside contractors, route identification is not a 
necessary step.  The funds required for transporting a specific NGO request can be 
estimated using the TRANSCOM SMS.  Applications are accepted on a first-come, first-
served basis until the yearly funding is exhausted. 
At its core, FTP is essentially an extension of the Denton Program, intended to 
reach destinations that are not accessible to space-available transportation assets.  
Similarly to the Denton Program, FTP is a public service by the DoD to NGOs.  In the 
past, the two programs have been administered by DSCA, which accounts for their 
similar operational requirements.  NGOs also drive the FTP process through their initial 
applications, as is the case with Denton. 
FTP derives its authority from USC 10, Section 2561; however, it is not the only 
expression of that authority.  Section 2561 allows DoD to use correct appropriations for 
humanitarian purposes, but does not contain the explicit requirements of Section 402, the 
Denton amendment.  Thus, it is possible for other programs to exist under Section 2561 
that do not explicitly follow the Denton model of transport.  In particular, Section 2561 
does allow for HA programs that are not driven by an NGO request for transportation to a 
predetermined consignee. 
FTP’s underutilization in EUCOM, as compared to other AORs, is a result of 
several factors.  First, similar to Denton, if no NGO applications requesting shipment to 
European destinations are submitted, then no material is transported to EUCOM by FTP.  
Second, because FTP is a public service to NGOs and operates on a first-come, first-
served basis; delivery locations are a result of NGO requests, and there is no expectation 
of an even distribution of HA material among AORs.  Third, for destinations in former 
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Soviet republics of Eastern Europe, the DoS funds a similar program administered 
through Counterpart International that services some NGO demand for Europe 
(Counterpart International, 2012).  Finally, FTP is limited by funding appropriated by 
Congress.  Once the funding for the fiscal year is exhausted, the program cannot make 
further shipments. 
D. CURRENT PROJECT HANDCLASP OPERATIONS 
Project Handclasp (PH) is a Department of the Navy (DoN) program, 
implemented by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1962 to support Navy 
humanitarian missions.  PH is governed by a CNO instruction that outlines its mission 
and operational goals.  Its primary purpose is to enhance the perceptions of the United 
States and the U.S. Navy through direct, person-to-person contact between U.S. Navy 
and Marine Corps personnel and people overseas.  PH may also arrange for space-
available transportation of NGO material to consigned recipients overseas, as long as that 
material fits into the categories outlined in the instruction.  PH falls under the direction 
and strategic guidance of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for Operations 
Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3N5) International Engagement Division (OPNAV N52).  
OPNAV N52 is the program sponsor and is responsible for the PH instruction.  
Consequently, PH provides quarterly reports to OPNAV N52 measuring program 
performance and providing updates on administration, expenses, and manning. 
Since PH is a DoN program executing a Navy mission, its operations are funded 
by the Navy.  In recent years, some COCOMs have assigned their personnel to assist PH 
in enhancing its ability to deliver material to the COCOMs’ AORs.  For instance, 
SOUTHCOM previously sent an officer to focus PH efforts on SOUTHCOM, and an 
officer from EUCOM is currently at PH to do the same for the EUCOM AOR. 
The operations of PH are facilitated by two separate legal entities.  The first is the 
Navy Project Handclasp (Navy PH) and the second is a nonprofit, NGO called the Project 
Handclasp Foundation, Inc. (PHF).  The PH transportation process begins with a 
donation to PHF from a corporation, a public service organization, or an individual.  PHF 
assumes legal title of the material once it is donated.  While legal title to the material is 
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held by PHF, Navy PH is operationally in charge of receiving, collecting, inspecting, 
consolidating, storing, and transporting the donated material. 
Donated material falls under two distinct categories: consigned or unconsigned.  
Consigned donations have a particular recipient or geographic area targeted by the donor.  
According to the PH instruction, consigned material is only accepted if the donor’s 
objectives contribute to the overall mission of Navy PH (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2006).  For consigned material, Navy PH provides transportation strictly on a 
space-available basis and the donor arranges for distribution to the identified consignee.  
In contrast, unconsigned donations are essentially goodwill material that can be used at 
the discretion of Navy PH. 
PH receives donations and is able to store them in a warehouse in San Diego with 
capacity for approximately 3,000 Navy pallets.  Following the CNO instruction, the 
material is properly inspected and often repackaged to meet transportation requirements.  
The material is then stored in the warehouse until an appropriate Navy mission is 
identified for the material’s overseas distribution.  To identify destinations for 
unconsigned material, Navy Component Commanders (NCCs) communicate their HA 
needs to Navy PH, and Navy PH arranges for transportation and distribution as 
necessary.  Throughout the entire process for both consigned and unconsigned material, 
PHF maintains the legal title to the donations; the Navy never legally owns  
donated material. 
Navy PH does not use a centralized system, such as SMS, to find space-available 
transportation.  Rather, they have access to Navy schedules through direct contact with 
fleet commanders.  Navy PH also tracks shipments through direct communication with 
ships’ crews.  Recently, PH has been part of a number of Navy missions, including 
Continuing Promise and Pacific Partnership.  In addition to the warehouse in San Diego, 
PH has access to several forward-deployed staging areas that can store 20 to 100 pallets.  
These staging areas are typically used to hold supplies for unforeseen disaster relief 
operations.  Occasionally, as a secondary mission, they can be used for short-term storage 
to facilitate transportation.  One such staging area is located in the EUCOM AOR in 
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Rota, Spain.  Others are located in Pearl Harbor; Norfolk; Mayport; Singapore; and 
Yokosuka, Japan. 
At its core, PH is a Navy program, funded by the Navy, executing a Navy 
mission.  As such, PH only has the authority to use Navy space-available assets.  PH’s 
transportation ability is limited by ship schedules, which are often unreliable and much 
more infrequent than the Air Force aircraft routes used by Denton.  The program is also 
labor-intensive and limitations are not necessarily the result of a deficiency of space-
available opportunities, but rather a limit on the manpower that is necessary to maintain 
private partner relationships and take advantage of transportation opportunities. 
PH contrasts with the other two programs in one key area.  Both Denton and FTP 
are a public service by the DoD, driven by NGO requests for transportation; whereas PH 
is driven by Navy mission requirements to improve perception of the U.S. Navy overseas.  
As an explicit example, PH can receive unconsigned donations and distribute them based 
on NCC requirements.  Once transported, the unconsigned PH material is ultimately 
distributed to the recipient by uniformed Navy or Marine Corps personnel. 
PH’s distribution of HA material in the EUCOM AOR has been limited.  The 
main reason is PH’s inability to use anything other than Navy assets, particularly space 
available on ships.  The countries to which EUCOM strives to provide HA typically do 
not have regularly scheduled ship port visits.  Thus, the opportunities for PH to schedule 
cargo deliveries are infrequent.  EUCOM is also at a disadvantage because scheduled 
humanitarian missions, such as Pacific Partnership and Continuing Promise, do not occur 
in their AOR.  These operations carry large amounts of PH material—for example, in 
2009, the Continuing Promise mission accounted for 425 pallets of SOUTHCOM’s total 
750 PH pallets.  Such missions historically have not occurred in EUCOM because these 
types of operations are often initiated in response to a natural disaster, in the case of 
Pacific Partnership, or to aid developing countries, as with Continuing Promise.  Europe 
typically does not have the same disaster-related and economic challenges faced by 
countries within the SOUTHCOM and PACOM regions.  However, strategically, 
building and maintaining relationships is as important in Europe as it is in other regions 
of the world. 
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Finally, a critical component of having effective HA transportation programs is to 
deliver cargo that satisfies a need at the destination.  EUCOM has been at the forefront of 
initiating a pull transportation system, where cargo is only shipped if it satisfies an 
identified requirement at the destination, as opposed to a push transportation system, 
where cargo is shipped if it is available and the channel exists.  Cargo pushed through the 
transportation system increases raw pallet numbers, but it often decreases the 
effectiveness and image of HA transportation programs because it goes unused after 
arriving at its destination.  Denton and FTP address this issue by requiring a 
predetermined consignee to the material.  In its current operational model, PH shipments 
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III. OPTIONS FOR INCREASING HUMANITARIAN SHIPPING 
CAPACITY TO UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMAMND 
A. UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE 
EUCOM would like to partner with NGOs and use deliveries of NGO-owned 
material to build and maintain strategic relationships within their AOR.  Delivery of HA 
material and direct involvement by DoD personnel improves perception of the DoD and 
its mission.  The effects of these donations remain long after the material is distributed, 
helping to build long-lasting partnerships with foreign nations.  By providing the 
mechanism for HA cargo delivery to countries in need, EUCOM is able to make steps 
toward regional security and stability, which consequently impacts the support our 
partners provide toward our global initiatives (United States European Command, n. d.). 
B. EXECUTOR OF COMBATANT COMMAND’S HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE CARGO TRANSPORTATION, PARTNERSHIP-
BUILDING MISSION 
The current guidance from the U.S. Secretary of Defense to the COCOM HA 
staffs lists Denton and the Funded Transportation Programs as the methods for 
transporting HA material to a destination in need (United States Secretary of Defense, 
2009).  Operationally, these two programs are not focused to address the COCOM 
relationship-building mission.  The programs are a public service by the DoD and are 
driven by NGO requests instead of COCOM priorities.  Currently, there is no lead 
executor for HA cargo transportation that focuses on the COCOM relationship-building 
missions, requirements, and priorities.  Table 1 provides a short summary of options for 
addressing this deficiency.  For the remainder of this section, we discuss some of these 
options in greater detail. 
16 
Table 1. Summary of options for addressing COCOM HA cargo transportation 
strategic relationship-building mission.  Currently, no agency focuses on 
COCOM priorities for HA cargo transportation. 
Option Summary Discussion Recommended?
1. Do nothing. 
Provides no quality of service for 
COCOM HA missions.  COCOMs may 
encourage and assist NGO applications 
for Denton and FTP.  COCOMs may ask 
for assistance to task PH through NCCs. 
No 
2. Realign Denton/FTP to 
focus on COCOM 
missions. 
Removes well-utilized and liked DoD 
programs.  Negatively impacts 
relationships with NGOs and partners.  
Removes the beneficial impact of 
existing programs. 
No 
3. Give joint role to PH. 
Builds on PH relationships with NGO 
partners and PH experience, expanding 
the program to non-Navy assets.  
Requires COCOM funding to execute 
COCOM mission.  Requires adjustment 
and expansion of PH operations. 
Yes 
4. Create common 
execution of 
transportation between 
Denton, FTP, and PH. 
Misapplies Denton and FTP to satisfy 
COCOM relationship-building mission.  
Has previously been attempted with little 
success.  Provides no quality of service 
guarantee to COCOMs. 
No 
5. Create new program as 
lead executor. 
Does not make use of existing expertise 
and capabilities in current HA cargo 
transportation programs. 
No 
6. Create multiple 
programs:  for each 
service or for each 
COCOM. 
Leads to confusion on the part of NGOs 
willing to assist.  Significantly 
complicates congressional reporting 
requirements. 
No 
The three HA transportation programs differ in their ability to execute the 
EUCOM partnership-building mission.  Both the Denton and the Funded Transportation 
Programs operate similarly as a public service provided by the DoD.  The Denton 
Program’s purpose, legally and operationally, is to facilitate NGO-owned cargo transport 
for NGOs.  The program is driven by NGO requests and, as such, using it to satisfy 
COCOM theater strategy would be a misapplication of the program.  The program may 
be suitable for occasional requests by NGOs that happen to coincide with COCOM 
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strategy, but no regular service for COCOMs can be expected.  Because FTP has a 
similar purpose and operation as the Denton Program, similar reasoning shows that it also 
is not ideal for executing COCOM HA missions. 
One explored method of executing COCOM HA cargo transportation operations 
is using PHF as the acting NGO for Denton and FTP applications.  Theoretically, such an 
approach would provide the PH process with multimodal transportation by giving it 
access to space available on Air Force planes through Denton and some funding from 
FTP.  A SOUTHCOM Naval officer who worked with PH submitted applications on 
behalf of PHF to both Denton and FTP.  These applications were unsuccessful for several 
reasons.  First, the legal authority of the Denton Program requires that the source of the 
transportation request be an NGO.  Initially, because of the normal procedural validations 
of Denton and FTP applications, care had to be taken to ensure that PHF satisfied the 
legal definition of an NGO.  After PHF was confirmed as a legitimate private sector 
organization, it could use the two programs.  However, both Denton and FTP have the 
policy that no special treatment can be given to any one NGO over others.  Thus, under 
this model, no quality-of-service guarantees can be made on PH’s ability to use 
multimodal transportation.  More importantly, this operational model is a misapplication 
of the Denton and Funded Transportation Programs because it attempts to use them to 
fulfill COCOM missions instead of their intended purpose—to provide a service  
to NGOs. 
In contrast with Denton and FTP, PH is designed to be a mission-oriented 
program whose main purpose is to satisfy Navy strategic objectives by increasing 
perceptions of the U.S. Navy abroad.  COCOM HA missions satisfy similar theaterwide 
strategic objectives.  The expertise and experience of PH could be used to achieve a 
similar mission for COCOMs as it does for the Navy:  to improve perception of the 
United States military through the delivery of HA material.  However, a number of 
operational changes would have to occur to facilitate such an expansion of the operations 
of PH. 
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C. METHODS OF CREATING A JOINT ROLE FOR PROJECT 
HANDCLASP 
Currently, PH is tasked and funded by the Navy to satisfy Navy mission 
objectives, and is limited to using Navy assets.  To satisfy COCOM HA cargo 
transportation missions, PH would require a joint role that elevates its operations from 
satisfying solely Navy objectives to a standard service available to combatant 
commanders to satisfy COCOM HA cargo transport mission requirements.  A general 
legal and financial outline of achieving this change in PH’s operations consists of the 
following steps: 
1. A COCOM incorporates the need to maintain and build relationships with 
countries in their AOR through Phase 0 programs—including the timely 
delivery of HA cargo—in their Theater Security Cooperation strategy and 
approved operational plans. 
2. A COCOM has the authority to organize the services to achieve its 
approved operational plans (Department of Defense, 2008).  This allows a 
COCOM to organize the services to support PH in accessing the DoD’s 
logistic capabilities. 
3. A service, however, does not resource its forces to support COCOM 
objectives.  Thus, a COCOM may also provide funding to achieve its 
approved, Phase 0, HA cargo transport objectives through its regular 
mission-funding routes.  Such a funding step would enable PH to access 
both outside contractor transport and space-available, low-priority DoD 
transport, increasing its logistic capabilities beyond the use of only  
Navy assets. 
4. Any DoD funding used for transportation of HA cargo falls under  
USC 10, Section 2561—the same authority used by FTP—and has the 
same requirements, such as annual reporting to Congress. 
In order for the COCOMs to achieve their strategic relationship-building 
objectives, the process for transporting HA cargo should be standardized, with a 
predictable quality of service.  Through the steps outlined above, a COCOM identifies 
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this as a mission requirement, and funds it through its regular mission-funding pathways; 
for example, its OHDACA funds.  It grants PH the ability to place cargo onto non-Navy 
and outside contractor assets for transportation of material that achieves the  
COCOM mission. 
Operationally, a joint role for PH would allow for direct tasking of PH by 
COCOM HA staff.  The current PH tasking by NCCs, combined with a lack of 
communication between NCCs and COCOMs, can lead to COCOM misperception of PH 
shipments as push shipments, even for deliveries initiated by NCC requests.  Moreover, 
NCCs do not have dedicated staff for HA missions, as do COCOMs.  Thus, direct tasking 
of PH by COCOM HA staff would increase transparency of shipments and improve the 
responsiveness of PH to COCOM theater objectives. 
Direct tasking could be performed in the following manner.  A COCOM could 
work with their local USAID representatives and the country teams to coordinate a 
priority list of material that would help with partnership-building.  Such a priority list 
could be published and given regularly to PH to match these requests with donated 
materials in the PH inventory.  Once material is identified, the COCOM HA staff, in 
conjunction with the recipient country team, could obtain the necessary duty-free and 
customs paperwork from the recipient country, and transportation could be executed by 
PH.  Direct tasking by the COCOM HA staff would reinforce a pull transportation system 
for procuring needed material to the COCOM AOR vice pushing HA donations that 
recipient countries may or may not need.  Because COCOMs would resource PH’s joint 
role, the performance of PH could be measured not by pallets or total weight, but by the 
number of shipments that satisfy a COCOM’s HA priorities. 
Even with a joint role, PH would continue to execute its Navy mission.  PH is 
well-positioned within the Navy’s logistic organizations, and has good administrative 
support.  Thus, it would be inadvisable to move PH to a different organization.  Instead, 
the Navy could be designated as the executive agent for COCOM HA cargo 
transportation requirements and PH could provide transparency and work with DSCA to 
prepare the annual reports to Congress.  Creating a joint role for PH could pose relatively 
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little administrative and operational effort and only a few policy changes, but would 
require high-level tasking from COCOMs, Navy commanders, and DoD HA officials. 
Throughout the process, care must be taken on several legal requirements.  First, 
at no point should donations be solicited from outside agencies.  Second, cargo 
transported through HA transportation programs should satisfy a legitimate humanitarian 
need.  Third, congressional reporting requirements for use of HA funding and 
transportation should be observed. 
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IV. QUANTITATIVE MODEL AND RESULTS 
In this section, we present a quantitative model used to analyze the transportation 
capacity of several logistic network options for varying transportation scenarios.  The 
model allows us to quantify the benefits of multimodal HA cargo transportation versus 
using a single mode of transportation.  The model also allows us to gauge the relative 
ability and cost of HA cargo transportation to reach different destination countries  
in EUCOM. 
A. MODEL 
In order to simulate the flow of HA cargo to the EUCOM AOR, we design a 
network model consisting of nodes and edges.  The nodes in the model are locations; 
including military bases in the continental United States that serve as points of origin for 
the cargo, transshipment nodes in Europe and other parts of the world, and destination 
nodes that represent the countries that are recipients of the donated cargo.  The edges in 
the model represent existing transportation channels, including Navy ship and air routes, 
Air Force air routes, and contract shipping channels, that can move cargo from one node 
to another.  The data associated with each edge is the respective mode of transportation, 
its cost, and an associated capacity distribution.  The capacity distribution is a description 
of the variability of space available in the channel and is derived from the frequency and 
type of vessels that travel that route.  For example, if 80% of the time there is no vessel 
moving across the channel, and the remaining 20% of the time there is a vessel with two 
space-available pallet positions, the capacity distribution would be [(0, 0.8), (2, 0.2)].  For 
the remainder of this section, when we refer to pallets, we are referencing standard  
Air Force pallets, the size of which is equivalent to approximately four Navy pallets. 
The data used for the model is obtained from SMS data on flight missions,  
Sixth Fleet (C6F) data on ship port visits in Europe, Navy Air Logistics Office (NALO) 
data on Navy air assets in EUCOM, and U.S. Army Military Surface Deployment and 
Distribution Command (SDDC) data on contracting costs.  The data used to create the 
model for the EUCOM AOR includes 47,324 flight legs obtained from SMS; 1,685 port 
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visits by 115 ships obtained from C6F; 2,519 flight legs obtained from NALO; and  
715 contract cost estimates obtained from SDDC for shipping in and between the  
United States and the EUCOM AOR.  The data reflects movement in EUCOM for the 
last two to five years.  The model consists of 124 nodes in North America and Europe.  
Nodes in the model are identified from SMS and C6F data.  For example, bases that 
appear frequently in SMS data or C6F data are included in the model, though we 
confined our analysis to locations within the vicinity of the United States and  
EUCOM AOR. 
We use the data from SMS, Sixth Fleet, and NALO to derive the capacity 
distributions associated with each edge.  We break up the data into two-week time 
periods and count the number and types of vessels that travel the channel in each  
two-week time span.  We use two weeks as our designated time span because this is the 
maximum amount of time that Denton cargo will typically be stored at any given 
intermediary location.  Additionally, we estimate the space available on each type of 
vessel based on operational experience and knowledge of individuals working in 
organizations with involvement in space-available transportation.  In this way, we 
compute a capacity distribution for each edge.  Cost data associated with edges that 
represent contract transportation is obtained from SDDC data.  Transportation Priority 4 
rates for Air Force transport are obtained from Air Mobility Command. 
B. RESULTS 
Figures 1 through 4 show the network and all available channels for both sea 
lanes and air routes originating in the continental United States (CONUS) and arriving in 
1 of the 17 destinations to which EUCOM provides HA. 
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Figure 1.   A map of all Air Force aircraft routes in the model originating from the 
United States.  Red dots represent possible cargo origins, green dots 
represent transshipment locations, and the green edges represent an 
aircraft route identified from SMS data. 
 
Figure 2.   A map of all Air Force aircraft routes in the model arriving in Europe.  
Green dots represent transshipment locations, yellow dots represent 
destination nodes, and the green edges represent aircraft routes identified 
from SMS data. 
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Figure 3.   A map of all Navy routes in the model originating from the United States.  
Red dots represent cargo origins, green dots represent transshipment 
nodes, and blue edges represent routes identified from Sixth Fleet or 
NALO data. 
 
Figure 4.   A map of all Navy routes in the model arriving in Europe.  Green dots 
represent transshipment nodes, yellow dots represent destination nodes, 
and blue edges represent routes identified from Sixth Fleet or NALO data. 
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 We divide the available logistic channels into three categories—Navy channels 
including Navy ships and NALO flights, Air Force aircraft channels, and contract 
channels—and create a logistic model for each kind of transportation.  A Navy  
channel-only network models transportation that only uses space available on Navy 
assets.  An Air Force channel-only network models transportation that only uses space 
available on Air Force aircraft.  A contract channel-only network models cargo 
movement using only contracted transportation.  Finally, we create a fourth network that 
models combined operations of all three modes of transportation. 
We analyze several logistic scenarios.  For each of the four networks, we analyze 
the network’s ability to move cargo from the United States to each of the 17 countries of 
interest in the EUCOM AOR, for a total of 64 scenarios.  In each scenario, the cargo is 
allowed to originate in any part of the United States, must use only transportation edges 
allowed in the scenario, and must be delivered to the destination country of the scenario. 
Figure 5 visually depicts one such scenario, transporting cargo to Montenegro 
using only space available on Air Force aircraft.  For this scenario, the model shows that, 
on average, space available on Air Force aircraft is able to support approximately 0.45 
pallets per two-week time period.  This is an average shipment amount per unit time, and 
operationally translates into the ability to ship a single pallet about every month and a 
half.  The model also identifies the legs from McGuire to Ramstein, Dover to Ramstein, 
Bangor International to Ramstein, and Ramstein to Montenegro as the essential channels 
for delivering this cargo.  These results reflect a 100% utilization of space-available 
routes if they exist.  In reality, human operators may not be able to achieve such 
utilization rates, and thus the numbers indicate an upper-bound on performance.  The 
upper-bounds are informative, and later in this section we compare results from lower 
utilization rates with these optimistic upper-bounds.  Unless otherwise specified, the 
numbers for space-available logistic networks in this section reflect full utilization. 
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Figure 5.   Scenario of transporting cargo to Montenegro using only space available 
on Air Force aircraft.  Yellow dots represent possible cargo destinations 
and green dots represent possible transshipment locations.  The edge 
colors and thicknesses represent the relative usage of those shipping 
routes.  Thicker, brighter edges make for relatively better, more reliable 
routes to Montenegro.  Thinner, darker edges also make for routes to 
Montenegro, but of poorer quality.  No edges are drawn when no  
route exists. 
Table 2 lists the performance of various logistic networks for four hypothetical 
HA transportation instances.  The four instances were derived from discussions with the 
HA transportation programs and are based on likely availability of cargo and EUCOM 
HA requirements.  The instances include:  (1) shipping two pallets of school supplies 
from San Diego to Albania; (2) shipping two pallets of water filters from San Diego to 
Bosnia; (3) shipping an x-ray machine approximately two pallets in size from San Diego 
to Croatia; and (4) shipping two pallets of school supplies starting from Campbell Air 
Force Base (AFB) to Azerbaijan.  The results assume a 2-4 week lag time for contractors 
to execute shipments.  For a combined operation, if a space-available transportation leg 
that decreases total costs exists, it is combined with contracting to limit costs.  The results 
in Table 2 indicate that using only space-available transportation networks is insufficient 
for transporting COCOM HA cargo.  In addition, the comparison of the contract network 
versus the combined operation network indicates that combined operation of space 
available plus contracting offers little benefit over contracting alone. 
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Table 2. Performance of four logistic networks against four hypothetical HA 
transportation instances.  The results indicate that exclusively space-
available networks (Navy and Air Force) are insufficient to transport HA 
material in a timely manner.  In addition, a combined operation offers 
limited advantages over pure contracting.  Estimated transportation costs 
are rounded to the nearest one hundred dollars.  The designation “N/A” 
stands for “not available” and means that transport using this logistic 
network is not possible because a feasible route is highly unlikely.  The 
exclusively space-available networks (Navy and Air Force) can have 
slightly improved performance if any origin from CONUS can be used to 
initiate space-available transport.  The expected wait times to EUCOM 
destinations, if any CONUS origin can be used, are depicted in Figures 6 
and 7. 






San Diego Albania Two pallets of school 
supplies 
Navy N/A N/A 
Air Force N/A N/A 
Contract 2-4 5,000 
Combined 2-4 5,000 
San Diego Bosnia Two pallets of water filters Navy N/A N/A 
Air Force N/A N/A 
Contract 2-4 5,600 
Combined 2-4 5,600 
San Diego Croatia One x-ray machine, about 
two pallets in size 
Navy N/A N/A 
Air Force N/A N/A 
Contract 2-4 5,000 
Combined 2-4 5,000 
Campbell AFB Azerbaijan Two pallets of school 
supplies 
Navy N/A N/A 
Air Force 66 0 
Contract 2-4 6,300 
Combined 2-4 6,200 
The model yields expected wait times in weeks for Air Force space-available and 
Navy space-available transportation to the 17 destination countries.  Figure 6 shows the 
expected wait times for Air Force space-available transportation and Figure 7 shows the 
expected wait times for Navy space-available transportation.  These wait times contrast 
with the transportation instances in Table 2 because the cargo is assumed to originate in 
any CONUS location where a route is available; for example, through CONUS trucking.  
Of the 17 countries, only five exhibit wait times of less than a year for Air Force  
space-available transportation:  Romania, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, and 
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Georgia.  The low wait times for Azerbaijan and Georgia are likely the result of 
operations in Afghanistan and would change as those operations draw down.  In the case 
of Navy space-available transportation, the performance is similar.  Only five countries, 
Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania, Croatia, and Georgia exhibit wait times of less than a 
year.  Combining these results, even under the optimistic assumption of full utilization of 
space-available routes, currently no military space-available transportation channels exist 
to 11 of the 17 EUCOM destinations of interest. 
 
Figure 6.   A bar graph of expected wait time for air space-available cargo 
transportation, in weeks, by destination country.  The vertical lines above 
the bars represent a 95% confidence interval.  These wait times assume 
that cargo can originate in any CONUS origin, if a space-available route 
from that origin exists.  The wait times also assume an optimistic 100% 
utilization of space-available routes.  Even under such optimistic 
assumptions, only 5 of 17 EUCOM destinations exhibit wait times of less 
than one year. 
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Figure 7.   A bar graph of expected wait time for Navy space-available cargo 
transportation, in weeks, by destination country.  This network includes 
Navy shipping and NALO flights.  The vertical lines above the bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals.  These wait times assume that cargo 
can originate in any CONUS origin, if a space-available route from that 
origin exists, as well as an optimistic 100% utilization of space-available 
routes.  Even under such optimistic assumptions, only 5 of 17 EUCOM 
destinations exhibit wait times of less than one year. 
Figure 8 depicts the three best and three worst destinations in terms of 
transportation capability of the combined logistic network.  The three best destinations 
are Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.  The three worst destinations are Georgia, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan.  The figure also depicts the performance of each of the four logistic 
networks, for each of these six country destinations.  As exhibited by the preceding 
results, in general, the space-available networks have very little or no transportation 
capacity.  The contract network and the combined network have roughly the same 
capacity for each destination because combined operations rely on contractors for the 
most part, substituting with space-available when possible.  The best and worst 
destinations differ largely by the estimated contracting cost for shipping a pallet to the 
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destination.  The combined network, because it can combine space available and 
contracting, is always the logistic network with the highest transportation capacity; 
however, it offers relatively little benefit over contracting alone. 
 
Figure 8.   A bar graph of the average number of pallets delivered for four logistic 
scenarios to the three best-performing countries and the three worst-
performing countries.  The vertical axis represents the average number of 
pallets that can be transported in a two-week time period.  Blue bars 
represent the Navy logistic network, orange bars the contract network, 
gray bars the Air Force network, and yellow bars the combined logistic 
network.  The vertical lines above the bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals for the estimated performance of the network.  Space-available 
networks generally offer little transportation capability to these countries.  
The contracting and combined networks have comparable performance, 
with combined operations outperforming slightly due to marginally 
smaller costs.  For these results, a transportation budget of approximately 
$10,000 per two-week time period is assumed, based on expenditures on 
the order of the FTP annual budget allocated equally among geographic 
COCOMs and spread evenly throughout the year. 
Figure 9 depicts the estimated cost of shipping a single pallet from San Diego to 
each of the 17 countries of interest in the EUCOM AOR.  The figure contrasts the cost of 
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shipping using contracting only as compared to a combined operation that uses  
space-available transportation when present.  A combined operation allows for some 
decrease in cost, ranging from 15% to 30%, but does not offer significant improvements.  
This is consistent with historic research on peacetime transportation using contractors 
(Lewis, 1995). 
 
Figure 9.   Estimated costs of shipping a single pallet to each EUCOM destination of 
interest.  The orange bars represent costs using contract shipping only.  
The yellow bars represent costs from a combined operation, substituting 
space available for contract when possible.  A combined operation offers 
approximately a 15% to 30% cost decrease over exclusively using 
contractors. 
Finally, Figure 10 represents the total shipping capacity in pallets for a range of 
budget values.  The vertical dashed line is at approximately $10,000 per two weeks, 
which is approximately equal to $260,000 per year—the value of splitting the FTP budget 
equally among the geographic COCOMs.  The right-most extent of the horizontal axis is 
at a budget of approximately $55,000 per two weeks, or approximately $1.5 million per 
year—the value of the entire annual FTP budget.  The yellow line indicates the 
performance of a combined operation, while the orange line indicates a contract-only 
operation.  For an equal budget allocation, the combined operation offers approximately 
two more pallets per two-week period than a contract-only operation.  This is more 
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significant at small budget values, but at a budget value of $10,000 per two weeks, it is 
less than a 30% improvement. 
 
Figure 10.   A comparison of contract-only operations and combined operations at a 
range of budget values.  The vertical dashed line is at approximately 
10,000 dollars per two weeks, or 250,000 per year—the value of the FTP 
budget, split evenly across the geographic COCOMs.  At this value, a 
combined operation offers less than a 30% increase in capacity when 
compared to contract-only operations. 
C. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the analytical model indicate that space-available transportation is 
insufficient to address EUCOM HA shipping requirements.  In addition, a cost 
comparison between contract-only operations and combined operations shows limited 
improvement for a combined operation.  This, combined with the relatively easy 
execution of contract-only operations, suggests that allowing for contract transportation 
of EUCOM HA material may be a reasonable method of providing quality service for the 
COCOM relationship-building mission at a relatively low cost. 
The results presented from the analytical model assume an optimistic 100% 
utilization of space available when present.  In reality, human operators are likely unable 
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to achieve such a degree of utilization without significant automation improvements.  
One effort to create such automation improvements is the U.S. Fleet Forces Command’s 
Lifts of Opportunity/Opportune Lift Program administered by the Navy Supply Logistics 
Operation Center.  The goal of the program is to consider all scheduled conveyances and 
search for opportune lift.  One aspect of the program is an automated Transportation 
Exploitation Tool (TET) available on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNet) through a collaborative effort with the U.S. Department of Energy.  The TET 
prototype provides Orbitz-like search capability for opportune lift. 
Until tools such as TET become operational and widely available, human 
operators are required for scheduling and tracking space-available transportation.  Even 
small amounts of underutilization lead to drastically reduced performance of  
space-available networks.  For example, Figure 10 depicts wait times for an air network 
with 80% utilization (compare with Figure 6).  Even at a relatively high level of 80% 
utilization, only 2 out of 17 EUCOM destinations of interest has a wait time of less than 
one year. 
 
Figure 11.   Expected wait times for an air network with 80% utilization of  
space-available channels.  The performance of the network, even at a 
relatively high utilization of 80%, is significantly degraded when 
compared to the performance of a 100% utilization network (see Figure 6). 
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Space-available transport, especially to destinations with infrequent visits by DoD 
assets, is inherently unreliable, leading to long expected wait times before delivery.  
Contracted delivery provides increased reliability that could be advantageous to 
relationship-building missions.  It may be possible to increase the reliability of  
space-available transport by purchasing some intermediate storage locations, where 
material can wait and increase the number of space-available connections.  However, 
such intermediate storage locations would come at an additional cost. 
While the model presented here is derived using current and thorough input data 
as well as modern modeling techniques, in any model there is no way of accounting for 
the multitude and complexity of human factors that make the real-world logistics 
operations work.  Although critical to daily operations, these are elements that are 
impossible to model mathematically.  Nevertheless, model results can provide insights 
into the capabilities of different logistics operations and the relative merits of varying 
policy decisions.  To paraphrase a quote from George Box, all models are wrong, but 
some models are useful (Box, 1979). 
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